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Bernard Montgomery, History (Re)writer
The stated goal of Montgomery and the Battle of Nor-
mandy is to “bring together the most important Bernard
Montgomery documents for the period 1 January to 20
August 1944, reproduce each of the chosen documents in
full and arrange them in a straightforward chronologi-
cal order” (p. x). It is fair to say this volume achieves
this goal, even though a batch ofMontgomery documents
already reproduced in full in other volumes was not in-
cluded here.
The precise selection of a much larger set of available
documents (the diaries, letters, and speeches of Mont-
gomery) that appear here is the result of culling and eval-
uation by Stephen Brooks, who previously performed
a similar task for Montgomery’s North African papers.
Brooks provides some evaluative commentary relating to
the documents (primarily in footnotes) and often guides
readers to other sources on issues of dispute that arise.
Overall, his treatment of “Monty” is gentle and, in con-
trast to recent histories of the Normandy campaign, he
generally resists skeweringMontgomery’s interpretation
of events.
On occasion, he lets Montgomery off the hook rather
easily in his commentary in the 650 valuable footnotes.
Illustrations include British failures to take Caen early on
and Monty’s inability to close the Falaise gap in August
1944. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to conclude that
this collection of 211 Montgomery documents is a view
of Montgomery through rose-colored glasses. For exam-
ple, although Brooks opines that “the documents show
Montgomery as a brilliant communicator,” he also cat-
alogs Montgomery’s many spats with a wide variety of
military and political figures (p. 2).
Six generalizations emerge from these documents.
First, Montgomery was a skillful, meticulous, determined
organizer who was very good at organizing, mounting,
supporting, and operating an army, even if subsequently
he was not always the optimal decision maker in com-
bat conditions. Second, Montgomery, when he wished to
be, could be both charming and charismatic and evinced
the ability to inspire confidence and increase morale
among his charges. Third, an egotist, Montgomery was
confident he possessed distinctive, superior knowledge
and understanding of the military, how wars should be
fought, and, in particular, how to defeat the Germans. He
regarded the defeat of the Germans in Normandy as ev-
idence of this. Fourth, Montgomery seldom shied away
from the opportunity to criticize or denigrate all but a
few other military leaders and political figures. Fifth, his
scathing comments about his military colleagues of ev-
ery nationality betray either a brimming self-confidence
of Pattonesque magnitude, or a lurking inferiority com-
plex that motivated him to attempt to cut down numer-
ous contemporaries. Montgomery frequently was un-
able to admit his own errors or shortcomings. Finally,
Montgomery’s diary appears to have been written with
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an eye to postwar historical analysis. Montgomery seems
to have deliberately shaded his diary comments, and per-
haps even revised his views on matters with future his-
torians in mind. When “facts” did not fit his desired nar-
rative, he often revised his story, and soon claimed that
the new version was what he had predicted all along.
Montgomery’s consistent criticism of nearly every
other military and political leader stands out in these
documents. At the top, he laid wood to individuals
such as Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Arthur Tedder,
Arthur Coningham, Bernard Law Alexander, and Henry
Crerar. Churchill is painted as an interfering pain-in-
the-neck. General de Gaulle, admittedly a difficult figure,
struckMontgomery as an individual whowas “a poor fish
and gives out no inspiration” (p. 144). Montgomery por-
trayed Eisenhower as a loud, though amiable individual
of limited talent whose “ignorance as to how to run a war
is absolute and complete” (p. 298).
Air Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, air
commander for the Normandy invasion, “is definitely
above his ceiling in his present job and is not good
enough for the job we are on” (p. 58). Monty added
that Leigh-Mallory was “a gutless bugger” and summa-
rized, “I have no use for him” (p. 135). Of Air Marshall
Arthur Tedder, the deputy commander of the entire in-
vasion force, Montgomery opined, “he is very weak” (p.
167).
Montgomery’s most revealing and pungent com-
ments usually appear in his personal letters, which of-
ten were dispatched to Alan Brooke, chief of the Im-
perial General Staff. For example, Montgomery told
Brooke that Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham, who
was in charge of tactical air support for the invasion, is
“a bad man, not genuine, and terribly jealous” (p. 166).
General Harold Alexander, who commanded the British
15th Army Group in Italy and who had originally been
proposed by Eisenhower to lead all Normandy invasion
forces, was castigated by Monty as “definitely third class
as a high commander. It will be interesting to see when
the P.M., and others, discover that Alexander is no good”
(p. 104). Apparently they did not come to that realiza-
tion, since Alexander was made a field marshall in 1945
and elevated to a peerage in 1946.
Of General Henry Crerar, the senior Canadian com-
mander, Montgomery complained, “I fear very much that
Harry Crerar will be quite unfit to command any Army….
He is very prosy and stodgy, and he is very definitely
not a commander” (p. 185). Crerar, averred Monty, “is
a very poor soldier, and has much to learn” (p. 244). It
is hardly an accident that Antony Beevor, the most re-
cent major historian of the Normandy battle, observes,
“Senior Canadian officers detected a supercilious attitude
toward them.”[1] Such an attitude appears to have come
naturally to Montgomery.
On occasions, Montgomery’s arrows were aimed at
larger groups such as the British War Office, where
Monty lamented that “there is no one in the War Of-
fice who is a really good soldier” (p. 94). In this vein,
he decided (correctly) that he had to recast the entire
Normandy invasion plan after he took command of the
invasion ground forces in January 1944. In a Febru-
ary 24, 1944 letter to Admiral Louis Montbatten, Monty
lamented, “Here in England, I found everything and ev-
eryone was just drifting along. Rather pathetic really. It
all had to be changed” (p. 54). In an April 1 diary entry,
he minced no words: “The original plan for Overlord was
wrong … many changes had to be made quickly. But the
job has been done; Overlord is now properly ’teed up’
and the plan is good” (p. 65). Monty motivated those
changes by purging the ranks of the invasion planners
he inherited and bringing in more than a hundred of his
own people. He summarized, “We found we had to recast
the operational plan, the administrative plan, and in fact
practically everything” (p. 133). Virtually the only fig-
ures of consequence who avoided Montgomery’s rhetor-
ical scythe were Alan Brooke and American 1st Army
commander Omar Bradley, although the latter fell into
the category of those Monty classified as unknowledge-
able, but willing to learn from the master.
As the battle in Normandy progressed, it became ap-
parent that Montgomery was a risk-averting comman-
der, at least where British and Commonwealth forces
were concerned. By August 11, 1944, British and Cana-
dian forces had sustained 68,000 casualties, but the Amer-
icans 102,000. Only 18,000 German prisoners had been
captured by the British and Canadians by that date, but
92,000 by the Americans. What was Monty’s reaction to
frequent charges that the Commonwealth forces he led
were too cautious? “The bigger American casualties are
due to their lack of skill in fighting” (p. 223). He is fortu-
nate that this comment did not come to light at the time;
the pressure to sack himmight have become overwhelm-
ing.
Montgomery’s public stance in response to criti-
cism that he was too timid a general was to promise
Eisenhower repeatedly that the British and Canadians
would undertake sustained offensives, though his own
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private orders consistently undercut that goal. Given the
high level of Commonwealth casualties in World War
I, Monty’s approach was understandable, but came at a
cost to his own reputation. As Beevor has noted, “Senior
American officers were becoming scornful of what they
saw as an inexcusable caution on the British front.”[2]
Montgomery acknowledged in his diaries that Eisen-
hower had prodded him several times to become more
aggressive. His July 22 diary entry states, “Eisenhower
wrote me a letter which expressed concern at my stop-
ping operations on the eastern flank” (p. 233). Several
days later, Eisenhower came to visit: “He talked a good
deal about public opinion in America and … the feel-
ing that the U.S. troops were doing more than the British
troops” (p. 239).
Montgomery’s response was to assert repeatedly that
everything was going according to his long-standing
plan. Representative is his August 4 diary entry (seem-
ingly written with future historians in mind): “If we ex-
amine the map I used in England when expounding to
all General officers the development of the land battle in
Normandy, it will be seen that the battle has followed
almost exactly the course prescribed” (p. 269). How-
ever, Monty’s own maps belie this statement, for exam-
ple, with respect to his failure to capture Caen within the
first few days of the invasion.
One explanation for the slow progress of Common-
wealth forces against the Germans was Montgomery’s
claim that his eastern flank of Allied forces frequently
faced the cream of German armored divisions (often
true). Unable to dislodge the Germans, Monty soon be-
gan to argue that he had deliberately sought out this ar-
rangement. “My broad policy, oncewe had secured a firm
lodgment area, has always been to draw the main enemy
forces into the battle on our eastern flank, and to fight
them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could
proceed the easier” (p. 174). Thus, he flexibly adjusted his
rhetoric and “his plans” to reflect reality. He also fired
several generals to counterattack the claim that he did
not push Commonwealth forces hard enough.
Retrospectively, however, it was the failure of Mont-
gomery to close the Falaise gap in early August 1944 and
thereby trap the great bulk of German ground forces in
Normandy that has subjected him to more criticism than
any other of his Normandy decisions. German forces had
undertaken a high-stakes offensive gamble in the form
of a tank thrust to the Atlantic coast, designed to cut
Allied forces in two. At least partially because of Ul-
tra code-breaking (an advantage that Montgomery never
acknowledged that he benefited from, either there or in
North Africa), U.S. forces were able to repel this attack.
This situation meant that German forces were overex-
tended and plagued by highly vulnerable flanks. With
Canadians and Poles under Monty’s command coming
from the north, and Americans under Patton’s command
coming from the south, the Germans could be cut off and
devastated.
The Falaise gap eventually was closed, but not be-
fore many Germans escaped to fight another day. Most
historians believe that Montgomery’s lukewarm orders,
his decision to have the Americans stop short of clos-
ing the gap, and his failure to supply reinforcements in
a timely fashion were at fault. Antony Beevor concluded
that this episode “would be disastrous for Montgomery’s
reputation and credibility”[3]. Monty fought such assess-
ments after the war by authoring eight books, four of
which dealt specifically with his war experiences. In sev-
eral, he reasserted his summer 1944 Normandy claim that
“present operations are absolutely as planned” (p. 263);
however, the weight of historical opinion has not come
down in his favor in this regard.
The picture of Montgomery painted by these docu-
ments (and especially his own letters and diary entries)
is one of a highly knowledgeable and skilled organizer of
military activity. Monty understood command structure,
the importance of supply and the need for coordination,
and the intricacies of reporting relationships. He was a
capable, sometimes even inspiring, speech-maker and of-
ten elicited strong, iconic loyalty from his subordinates.
Even so, he was a man of great self-esteem and pre-
tense who as early as February 19, 1944 wrote that “the
nation is beginning to look to me to lead them to vic-
tory. The whole of England know me as ’Monty,’ and I
am recognized at once by every man, woman and child,
in the land” (p. 46). Perhaps this self–perception was
why in spring 1944 he proposed a “Public Hallowing of
the Armed Forces of the Crown” at St. Paul’s Cathedral
and suggested that coronation regalia be utilized in the
ceremony. Not surprisingly, this attempt to evoke the
whiff of royalty inside the senior military hierarchy did
not fly.
Bernard Montgomery was a successful military com-
mander and his mode of operation minimized British
casualties–an argument that is nonetheless debatable.
The reality is that Monty harbored few doubts; he be-
lieved his view of military affairs was the gospel. Con-
sequently, he stood ready to belittle anyone who did not
agree with what he perceived to be his superior analyt-
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ical intellect, unless of course they acquiesced to “learn”
from him.
With respect to Montgomery’s Normandy decision
making, Beevor sums Monty up well: “The problem was
that Montgomery, partly for reasons of morale and partly
out of puerile pride, could not admit that any of his plans
had gone wrong.”[4] This issue dims an otherwise illus-
trious military career.
Should you read the originalMontgomery documents
Stephen Brooks has provided? Yes, if you wish to inspect
the historical basis for the critical reviews of Monty’s
leadership that have appeared in most recent Normandy
histories. For most scholars, however, it will be enough
to know that a documentary basis for such conclusions
exists, and on the whole, Monty has not been dealt with
unfairly.
Notes
[1]. Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy
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